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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Charles Earl Guess appeals from the district court's orders denying his 
I.C. § 19-2604(1) motions for dismissal of the withheld judgment entered upon 
his guilty plea to aggravated assault. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In April 2006, Guess held his wife and her divorce attorney at gunpoint, 
threatened to kill both of them, and twice struck his wife in the face with his hand. 
(R., vol. I, pp.23-26; PSI, pp.2-5, 7-9, 18-23,27-32.) The state charged him with 
domestic battery and two counts of aggravated assault. (R., vol. I, pp.16-17.) 
Pursuant to a binding Rule 11 plea agreement, the state filed an amended 
information alleging one count of aggravated assault, and Guess pled guilty to 
that charge. (R., vol. I, pp.49-56.) As part of the Rule 11 agreement, the parties 
stipulated that Guess "shall receive a Withheld Judgment and shall be placed on 
probation to the Idaho State Department of Corrections for a period of no more 
than five (5) years." (R., vol. I, p.53.) The district court accepted the plea 
agreement and, consistent therewith, withheld judgment and placed Guess on 
supervised probation for a period of five years, commencing August 31, 2006. 
(R., vol. I, pp.103-11.) Guess performed well on probation and was transferred 
to unsupervised status on January 27, 2011. (R., vol. II, pp.171-73.) 
On September 7, 2011, Guess filed a "Motion To Dismiss Withheld 
Judgment," requesting pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1) that the district court enter 
an order "terminating the sentence and setting aside the guilty plea of the 
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Defendant, and finally dismissing the case and discharging the Defendant." (R., 
vol. II, pp.174-75.) In support of his motion, Guess submitted his own affidavit 
and 14 letters of support. (R., vol. II, pp.176-209.) At the hearing on the motion, 
Guess' ex-wife, Michele, indicated that she was still fearful of Guess and, "as a 
victim, will always be in fear of Mr. Guess." (Tr., p.55, Ls.11-24.) The state 
indicated it was "not aware of any legal basis as far as a probation violation or 
any noncompliance with probation on the part of Dr. Guess that would forbid him 
seeking this relief' and left the decision to the court's discretion. (Tr., p.56, LS.2-
15.) After considering all of the information before it, the district court denied the 
motion without prejudice, reasoning: 
Well, I would say that this is a hard case. On one side, I 
have a defendant who has performed as well as any defendant I 
can remember while on probation. I have thoughtful and numerous 
letters from people who apparently know the defendant and can 
vouch for him and his performance while on probation. 
On the other side of the scale, I have what is abominable 
behavior which resulted in a plea of guilty being tendered by the 
defendant and a victim who is the mother of the defendant's son, 
and who apparently still is in fear of the defendant. ... 
I think [the prosecutor] is correct that in virtually all of these 
cases in the past where I've been shown what I have been shown 
in this case, I have granted the motion. I don't remember a case in 
the past in which a victim testified against the motion, frankly. So, 
the motion is denied without prejudice. 
(Tr., p.56, L.19 - p.57, L.15.) The court's ruling was memorialized in a written 
order entered on December 23,2011. (R., vol. II, pp.212-14.) In that order, the 
court also purported to formally discharge Guess from probation. (R., vol. II, 
p.213.) 
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On January 19, 2012, Guess filed a "Motion: (1) To Enforce Rule 11 Plea 
Agreement And Order Withholding Judgment, And To Set Aside Guilty Plea, 
Terminate Probation, Dismiss Action And Restore Civil Rights; Or, In The 
Alternative, (2) To Clarify Order Denying Defendant's Motion To Dismiss 
Withheld Judgment" (hereinafter "Motion To Enforce Rule 11 Plea Agreement") 
and affidavits in support thereof. (R, pp.218-59.) Guess argued both in his 
motion and at the hearing thereon that the court was bound by the Rule 11 plea 
agreement to grant an I.C. § 19-2604(1) dismissal following Guess' period of 
probation. (R, vol. II, pp.223-30, 232-38; Tr., p.15, L.15 - p.20, L.18.) 
Alternatively, Guess argued that he was entitled to the requested relief because 
he complied with the conditions of probation and, he contended, the requested 
relief was compatible with the public interest. (R, vol. II, pp.230-32; Tr., p.10, 
L.1 - p.14, L.2, p.20, L.19 - p.22, L.25.) The court rejected both arguments, 
ultimately concluding that (1) nothing in the Rule 11 agreement bound the court 
to grant the requested relief, and (2) in light of the victim's expressed fear of 
Guess, a dismissal of the case and a restoration of his civil rights pursuant to I.C. 
§ 19-2604(1) was not compatible with the public interest at that time. (Tr., p.37, 
L.25 - p.40, L.5, p.41, L.14 - p.42, L.13; R, vol. II, pp.280-87.) 
Guess filed a notice of appeal timely both from the district court's 
December 23, 2011 order denying his "Motion To Dismiss Withheld Judgment," 
and from the court's February 12, 2012 order denying his Motion To Enforce 
Rule 11 Plea Agreement. (R, vol. II, pp.273-77.) 
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ISSUES 
Guess' issue statement is set forth at page nine (9) of his Appellant's brief 
and, due to its length, is not repeated here. The state rephrases the issues on 
appeal as: 
1. Has Guess failed to establish either a breach of the plea agreement or a 
violation of his due process rights resulting from the district court's orders 
denying his motions for I.C. § 19-2604(1) relief? 
2. Has Guess failed to establish that the district court otherwise abused its 
discretion in denying his motions for I.C. § 19-2604(1) relief? 
3. Has Guess failed to establish that the district court lacked jurisdiction to 




Guess Has Failed To Establish Either A Breach Of The Plea Agreement Or A 
Violation Of His Due Process Rights Resulting From The District Court's Orders 
Denying His Motions For I.C. § 19-2604(1) Relief 
A. Introduction 
Guess argues that, by denying his motions for I.C. § 19-2604(1) relief, the 
district court breached the Rule 11 plea agreement and violated his due process 
rights. (Appellant's brief, pp.9-28, 40-41.) Guess' arguments fail. The language 
of the plea agreement is plain and unambiguous and nothing therein required the 
district court to grant Guess the requested relief. Because the ultimate dismissal 
of his case pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1) was never a term of the plea 
agreement, Guess has failed to show either a breach of the plea agreement or a 
resulting violation of his due process rights. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Plea agreements are contractual in nature. State v. Lutes, 141 Idaho 911, 
914, 120 P.3d 299, 302 (Ct. App. 2005). Therefore, as with other types of 
contracts, the interpretation and legal effect of a clear and unambiguous plea 
agreement are matters of law reviewed de novo. kl Likewise, "whether a plea 
agreement has been breached is a question of law to be reviewed by [the 
appellate court] de novo, in accordance with contract law standards." State v. 
Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, _,281 P.3d 90, 92 (2012) (quoting State v. Peterson, 
148 Idaho 593,595,226 P.3d 535, 537 (2010)); accord State v. Jafek 141 Idaho 
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71, 73, 106 P.3d 397, 399 (2005); State v. Schultz, 150 Idaho 97, 99, 244 P.3d 
241,243 (Ct. App. 2010). 
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues, 
including claimed due process violations, is one of deference to factual findings, 
unless they are clearly erroneous, but free review of whether constitutional 
requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found. State v. Decker, 152 
Idaho 142, _, 267 P.3d 729, 734 (Ct. App. 2011); State v. Jacobson, 150 
Idaho 131,134,244 P.3d 630, 633 (Ct. App. 2010). "It is the defendant's burden 
to demonstrate facts that constitute a due process violation." Decker, 152 Idaho 
at _, 267 P.3d at 734 (citing Jacobson, 150 Idaho at 134, 244 P.3d at 633; 
State v. Cantrell, 139 Idaho 409, 412, 80 P.3d 345, 348 (Ct. App. 2003)). 
C. The Plea Agreement Is Plain And Unambiguous And Nothing Therein 
Required The District Court To Grant Guess' Motions For I.C. § 19-
2604(1) Relief 
When a defendant has entered a guilty plea in reliance upon a plea 
agreement with the state, the state is bound to honor the letter of the agreement 
and is also bound to behave consistently with the terms of the agreement. 
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 
253, _, 281 P.3d 90, 92 (2012); State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 593, 595, 226 
P.3d 535, 537 (2010); State v. Lutes, 141 Idaho 911, 914, 120 P.3d 299, 302 
(Ct. App. 2005). Where, as here, a district court accepts without qualification 
what is intended by the parties to be a binding Rule 11 plea agreement, the 
court, as well as the prosecution and defendant, is bound by the terms of the 
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agreement. State v. Horkley, 125 Idaho 860, 865, 876 P.2d 142, 147 (Ct. App. 
1994); United States v. Ritsema, 89 F.3d 392, 401 (ih Cir. 1996). 
The principle that the state and court (in the case of a binding plea 
agreement) must honor the terms of a plea agreement "is derived from the Due 
Process Clause and the fundamental rule that, to be valid, a guilty plea must be 
both voluntary and intelligent." State v. Halbesleben, 147 Idaho 161, 165, 206 
P.3d 867, 871 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 405, 508-09 
(1984); State v. Rutherford, 107 Idaho 910,913,693 P.2d 1112,1115 (Ct. App. 
1985)). If the prosecution or court breaches one or more terms of the 
agreement, "it cannot be said that the defendant's plea was knowing and 
voluntary, for the defendant has been led to plead guilty on a false premise" 1.9.:. 
(citing State v. Jones, 139 Idaho 299, 301-02, 77 P.3d 988, 990-91 (Ct. App. 
2003)); see also Gomez, 153 Idaho at _, 281 P.3d at 93 ("[A] claim that the 
State breached a plea agreement affects whether the agreement was knowingly 
or voluntarily entered .... "); but see Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 137-
38 (2009) (,,[T]here is nothing to support the proposition that the government's 
breach of a plea agreement retroactively causes the defendant's agreement to 
have been unknowing or involuntary."). The defendant, however, bears the 
burden of proving a breach. Gomez, 153 Idaho at _,281 P.3d at 94. 
In determining whether a plea agreement has been breached, the 
appellate court must examine the language of the agreement at issue. lit (citing 
Peterson, 148 Idaho at 595, 226 P.3d at 537. If the language of the agreement 
is ambiguous, the ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the defendant. lit If, 
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on the other hand, the language of a written plea agreement is unambiguous -
i.e., not reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations - the court "will not look 
beyond the four corners of the agreement to determine the intent of the parties." 
kL. (citing Beus v. Beus, 151 Idaho 235, 241, 254 P.3d 1231,1237 (2011)). 
The language of the plea agreement in this case is unambiguous. 
Paragraph two (2) of the written agreement provides in relevant part: 
2. That the State and the Defendant agree that the appropriate 
disposition of this matter is as follows: 
That the Defendant shall receive a Withheld Judgment and 
shall be placed on probation to the Idaho State Department 
of Corrections for a period of no more than five (5) years. 
[Agreed upon terms of probation omitted.] 
(R., vol. I, p.53.) Pursuant to the plain and unambiguous language of this 
provision, the trial court's only obligation upon accepting the plea agreement was 
to withhold judgment and place Guess on probation for no more than five years, 
which the trial court did. (See R., vol. I, pp.103-11 (order withholding judgment 
and placing Guess on probation for five years).) Nothing in the plain language of 
the agreement imposed upon the court an additional obligation to ultimately 
dismiss the case pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1) upon Guess' satisfactory 
completion of probation. 
On appeal, Guess acknowledges that the written plea agreement is silent 
with respect to when, if ever, his guilty plea would be set aside pursuant to I.C. § 
19-2604(1). (Appellant's brief, pp.18, 21-22.) He argues, however, that the 
absence of any express provision allowing for I.C. § 19-2604(1) relief renders the 
plea agreement ambiguous and, as such, the agreement must be construed in 
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his favor. (See Appellant's brief, p.18 ("[T]he Rule 11 Plea Agreement is 
ambiguous because it is vague and indefinite as to when Charles' guilty plea 
would be set aside. As such, the Rule 11 Plea Agreement must be construed in 
Charles' favor and it is 'implied by the plea agreement' that his guilty plea would 
be set aside upon completing probation."); pp.21-22 ("Since the district court and 
State both assert that the Rule 11 Plea Agreement does not specifically state 
when Charles' guilty plea would be set aside ... , the State must bear the 
responsibility for that lack of clarity.").) Guess' attempt to equate silence with 
ambiguity and to have this Court read into the written agreement a provision that 
simply is not there is directly foreclosed by the Idaho Supreme Court's recent 
opinion in State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 281 P.3d 90 (2012). 
-' 
The defendant in Gomez pled guilty to three drug-related felonies. 19.:. at 
281 P.3d at 91-92. The written plea agreement called for specific 
sentencing recommendations but was silent with respect to restitution. 19.:. at 
_, 281 P.3d at 94. The district court imposed the agreed upon sentences and, 
at the state's request, also ordered Gomez to pay more than $129,000 in 
restitution related to the costs of investigation. 19.:. at _, 281 P.3d at 92. On 
appeal, Gomez argued that, because restitution was not mentioned in the plea 
agreement, the state's request for restitution and the issuance of the restitution 
order constituted a breach of that agreement. 19.:. The Idaho Supreme Court 
disagreed, ultimately concluding that, because the plain and unambiguous 
language of the written plea agreement was "silent as to the costs of restitution 
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or whether restitution would be sought," there was no agreement as to restitution 
and, as such, no breach. kl at _, 281 P.3d at 94-95. The Court explained: 
The parties could have included restitution in the written plea 
agreement if they wanted the agreement to contemplate the issue. 
When viewing the document within its four corners, the restitution 
order did not breach the contract as the issue was not 
contemplated in the plea agreement. Since the contract is clear 
and unambiguous, it is unnecessary for this Court to analyze any 
extrinsic evidence or to look at the intent of the parties. 
kl at _,281 P.3d at 95. 
The reasoning of Gomez applies equally in this case and compels the 
conclusion that the district court did not violate binding Rule 11 plea agreement 
by declining to order an I.C. § 19-2604(1) dismissal after Guess satisfactorily 
completed his probation. The written plea agreement calls for a specific 
sentencing disposition - i.e., a withheld judgment and no more than five years of 
probation - but is silent with respect to when, and whether, Guess would ever be 
entitled to dismissal of the case pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1). Because the plain 
and unambiguous language of the plea agreement does not even contemplate 
the issue of an I.C. § 19-2604(1) dismissal, the district court could not, and did 
not, breach the agreement by denying Guess' motions for I.C. § 19-2604(1) 
relief. Gomez, 153 Idaho at _,281 P.3d at 95. See also Lutes, 141 Idaho at 
914-15, 120 P.3d at 302-03 (where plea agreement called for period of retained 
jurisdiction but was silent as to whether defendant would be placed on probation 
at end of retained jurisdiction period, trial court did not breach agreement by 
relinquishing jurisdiction). 
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Contrary to Guess' assertions (see Appellant's brief, pp.18-21, 24-28), this 
is not a case like State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 593, 226 P.3d 535 (2010), where 
the state was bound by the defendant's understanding of the plea agreement 
because the prosecutor stood silent in the face of the defense's representation 
at the change of plea hearing regarding the meaning of an ambiguous term. 
Unlike the plea agreement at issue in Peterson, the plea agreement in this case 
is reduced to writing and unambiguously sets forth the state's and court's 
obligations with respect to the appropriate sentencing disposition, with no 
mention whatsoever of an eventual dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1). 
There being no ambiguity in the written plea agreement, it is the four corners of 
that agreement, not Guess' "reasonable understanding," that controls. See 
Gomez, 153 Idaho at _, 281 P.3d at 94-95 (distinguishing Peterson on basis 
that the plea agreement in that case was ambiguous and concluding: "Since the 
contract [in Gomez] is clear and unambiguous, it is unnecessary for this Court to 
analyze any extrinsic evidence or to look at the intent of the parties."). 
Even assuming evidence of Guess' "reasonable understanding" were at 
all relevant to interpretation of the unambiguous plea agreement, a review of 
Guess' statements at the change of plea hearing shows he understood that the 
term "withheld judgment," as used in the plea agreement, meant only that he 
could eventually petition for relief pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1), not that such 
relief would automatically be granted: 
THE COURT: And do you understand that the 
agreement contemplates that you would receive a withheld 
judgment as a result of pleading guilty to this charge? 
11 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: 
judgment" means? 
Do you know what a "withheld 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Why don't you explain to me what 
you're [sic] understanding is. 
THE DEFENDANT: Well, I mean that - I guess, I'd explain 
that - my understanding of the entire agreement is that I - that I 
am pleading guilty to this charge and that I will spend - my 
punishment will include 30 days in incarceration in the Latah 
County jail. I will pay a $1,000 fine. And I'm pleading guilty to one 
of the - one of the felony charges. I'll have a year period of 
probation, and if I fulfill the period of probation without any 
problems in that period of time, that the felony charges would -
would be dropped. 
[Clarification by defense counsel that the period of probation 
would be determined by the court.] 
THE COURT: Well, Mr. Guess, the - I think you 
understand what a withheld judgment means. It means that if you 
comply with your terms and conditions of probation that at the 
conclusion of the period of probation, which is for a period of no 
more than five years, according to the agreement, that you could 
come in and petition to have your guilty plea, which you 
tendered today, withdrawn and the charge against you 
dismissed. Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: I do, yes. 
(Tr., p.??, L.5 - p.?S, L.16 (emphasis added).) The above colloquy shows that, 
to the extent Guess believed the plea agreement calling for a withheld judgment 
meant the "felony charges would ... be dropped" upon his successful completion 
of probation, such misconception was expressly corrected by the district court 
who advised Guess that he could petition to have his guilty plea withdrawn and 
the case dismissed. Guess specifically acknowledged understanding the effect 
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of the withheld judgment, as contemplated by the plea agreement and explained 
by the district court. Guess' claim, both in his motions for I.C. § 19-2604(1) relief 
and on appeal, that he reasonably understood the plea agreement to provide for 
the automatic dismissal of the case upon his successful completion of probation 
is thus belied by his own statements at the time he actually entered his plea. 
Guess has failed to show that the court breached the plea agreement or acted 
contrary to his understanding thereof, as expressed during the plea colloquy, by 
declining to grant his motions for I.C. § 19-2604(1) relief.1 
In addition to arguing a breach of the plea agreement, Guess argues that 
the district court's and state's interpretation of the plea agreement as not 
requiring an automatic dismissal of the case upon Guess' successful completion 
of probation is "contrary to the legislature's intent for authorizing withheld 
judgments." (Appellant's brief, p.16.) According to Guess, the case law 
interpreting Idaho Code §§ 19-2601 (3) and 19-2604(1) "implicitly hold[s] that a 
court has no discretion to deny a request to set aside a guilty plea upon a 
defendant's compliance with the terms of probation and sentence under a 
withheld judgment." (ld. at 16-17; see also pp.40-41 ("Once the Court accepted 
the Rule 11 Plea Agreement, entered the resulting Order Withholding Judgment 
and Charles complied with the required sentence and probation, the remaining 
issue is purely the procedural step of setting aside his guilty plea and restoring 
his civil rights." (emphasis original)).) This argument is frivolous. 
Idaho Code § 19-2603(1) gives the court discretion to withhold judgment 
"on such terms and for such time" as the court may prescribe. Idaho Code § 19-
2604(1) provides that a court "may" thereafter set aside the defendant's plea and 
finally dismiss the case if two conditions are met: there have been no 
adjudicated probation violations and dismissal of the case is "compatible with the 
public interest." Neither of the authorities Guess cites stand for the proposition 
that a court must dismiss a case pursuant to I. C. § 19-2604( 1) upon a showing 
by the defendant that he has satisfactorily complied with the conditions of 
probation. Rather, the cases merely state that a trial court may not indefinitely 
withhold judgment, Ex parte Medley, 73 Idaho 474, 483-84, 253 P.2d 794, 800 
(1953), and that the satisfactory completion of probation is a condition that must 
be met before the district court can exercise its discretion to dismiss a case in 
which a withheld judgment has previously been entered, State v. Hanes, 139 
Idaho 392, 394, 79 P.3d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 2003). 
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The written Rule 11 plea agreement is unambiguous. Because nothing 
therein contemplates the automatic dismissal of the case pursuant to I.C. § 19-
2604(1) upon Guess' successful completion of probation, the district court did 
not breach the agreement by denying Guess' I.C. § 19-2604(1) motions. Having 
failed to show any breach, Guess has also failed to show any resulting violation 
of his due process rights. The district court's order denying Guess' Motion To 
Enforce Rule 11 Plea Agreement must be affirmed. 
II. 
Guess Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Otherwise 
Abused Its Discretion In Denying His Motions For I.C. § 19-2604(1) Relief 
Based On Its Determination That The Requested Relief Was 
Not Compatible With The Public Interest 
A. Introduction 
The district court denied Guess' "Motion To Dismiss Withheld Judgment," 
and his subsequent motion for clarification, based on its determination that a 
dismissal of the case was not yet "compatible with the public interest," as 
required by I.C. § 19-2604(1). Specifically, the court found that, while Guess had 
been an exemplary probationer, the nature of Guess' crime and the victim's 
continuing fear countenanced against an I.C. § 19-2604(1) dismissal and the 
resulting restoration of Guess' civil rights at that time. (R., vol. II, pp.212-13, 
284-86; Tr., p.56, L.19 - p.57, L.15, p.38, L.7 - p.40, L.5, p.41, L.14 - p.42, 
L.13.) Guess challenges the district court's rulings on a number of bases, none 
of which show an abuse of discretion in the denial, without prejudice, of his 
motions for I.C. § 19-2604(1) relief. 
14 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision to grant or deny motion made pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1) 
"rest[s] in the sound discretion of the district court." Housley v. State, 119 Idaho 
885, 890, 811 P.2d 495, 500 (Ct. App. 1991). When a trial court's discretionary 
decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered 
inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as 
one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the bounds of such 
discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific 
choices before it; and (3) whether the lower reached its decision by an exercise 
of reason. State v. Ruperd, 146 Idaho 742,743,202 P.3d 1228, 1289 (Ct. App. 
2009) (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989». 
C. Guess Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Discretion In The District Court's 
Determination That An I.C. § 19-2604(1) Dismissal Was Not Compatible 
With The Public Interest 
Guess sought relief pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1), which provides in 
relevant part: 
(1) If sentence has been imposed but suspended, or if sentence 
has been withheld, upon application of the defendant and upon 
satisfactory showing that: 
(a) The court did not find, and the defendant did not admit, 
in any probation violation proceeding that the defendant 
violated any of the terms or conditions of probation ... 
the court may, if convinced by the showing made that there is no 
longer cause for continuing the period of probation, and if it be 
compatible with the public interest, terminate the sentence or set 
aside the plea of guilty or conviction of the defendant, and finally 
dismiss the case and discharge the defendant .... The final 
dismissal of the case as herein provided shall have the effect of 
restoring the defendant to his civil rights. 
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I.C. § 19-2604(1) (as amended by 2011 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 187, § 1 ).2 
Pursuant to the plain language of this statute, a district court may exercise its 
discretion to set aside a guilty plea and finally dismiss a case in which a withheld 
judgment was previously entered only when (1) the defendant has no 
adjudicated probation violations, and (2) doing so is "compatible with the public 
interest." 
In support of his motion for an I.C. § 19-2604(1) dismissal, Guess 
submitted his own affidavit, which detailed his success on probation (R., vol. II, 
pp.176-77), as well as 14 letters of support (R., vol. II, pp.179-209), including a 
letter from his former psychologist who opined that Guess no longer posed a 
threat to his ex-wife (R, vol. II, pp.182-83). The district court specifically 
considered these materials and the fact that Guess had "performed as well as 
any defendant [the court could] remember while on probation." (Tr., p.56, Ls.19-
24.) "On the other side of the scale," however, the court also considered the 
"abominable behavior which resulted in" Guess' guilty plea and the fact that the 
victim, Michele Guess, stated at the hearing on Guess' motion that she still 
feared Guess. (Tr., p.56, L.25 - p.57, L.4.) Specifically, Michele stated: 
You know, I believe in resolution. But I also believe that I have my 
rights, too, as a victim. And the law is the law. And I believe that 
your decision will be honored. 
2 Before the 2011 amendment, I.C. § 19-2604(1) required as a prerequisite to 
the setting aside of a guilty plea and final dismissal of the case a "satisfactory 
showing that the defendant [had] at all times complied with the terms and 
conditions upon which he was placed on probation." 
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I do wish to continue my relationship with my son. And I 
would also like to tell you that I still have some fear. I will never 
probably resolve that and neither will my immediate family. 
So, it's your decision, Judge. And I have written a letter to 
you in the very beginning telling you my feelings about my position. 
And to this point, you know, I, as a victim, will always be in fear of 
Mr. Guess. So, it's your decision, Judge. And thank you for letting 
me speak. 
(Tr., p.55, Ls.11-24.) After balancing Michele's expressed fear and the nature of 
the crime against the fact that Guess had performed well on probation and had 
numerous letters of support, the district court denied Guess' motion without 
prejudice. (Tr., p.56, L.19-p.57, L.15; R., vol. II, pp.212-14.) 
Guess subsequently moved for "clarification" of the district court's order. 
(R., vol. II, pp.218-59.) The district court treated the motion as one for 
reconsideration and denied it without prejudice, explaining: 
There's a lot of water under the bridge here, and I think to 
get back to my earlier observation, this is a dynamic process. And 
in order for me to restore Mr. Guess's rights I have to find that it is 
compatible with the public interest, and I have to do that now as 
opposed to when I entered the withheld judgment. 
That isn't to say that I will never grant the relief requested by 
Mr. Guess, it's that at this juncture I'm unprepared to do so. So, to 
the extent that it's a motion to reconsider, I'm denying that, as well, 
but I'm denying that without prejudice. 
I think there will come a time when Mr. Guess's rights will be 
restored. I can't tell you when that time will be, but I think given the 
showing that I have seen, given the contrition that I have seen, 
given the rehabilitation that I have seen, I think Mr. Guess is on the 
right track as far as having me grant the relief that he requests. 
I can tell you I haven't ever seen the showing that was made 
by [defense counsel] at the last hearing as it relates to someone's 
rehabilitation. Mr. Guess is clearly contrite. He's remorseful. He 
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has done all that he can do in order to be awarded the relief that he 
seeks today. But I think there's a twofold determination. Not only 
must I determine that he has done everything that he can do, but 
that it would be compatible with public interest. 
I'm not saying that Michele Guess's acquiescence in this 
request is what needs to occur. I can tell you that if she had no 
objection, I would grant it, though. But at some point I may 
conclude that that acquiescence will never be forthcoming and that 
it is yet compatible with the public interest to grant Mr. Guess the 
relief he requests. 
This is a tough case. I don't think there's any doubt about it. 
But I don't think the Rule 11 Agreement obligates me to grant him 
the relief he requests even if he did everything that was required of 
him. I think I still must make an independent determination that 
granting the relief requested is compatible with public interest, and 
I'm not quite there yet. 
(Tr., p.38, L.7 - pAD, L.5; see also R., vol. II, pp.28D-87 (written order denying 
motion).) In response to a request for clarification by defense counsel, the 
district court further elucidated the basis of its ruling, ultimately explaining: "[M]y 
hesitancy is based on the compatibility with the public interest, and Michele 
Guess as a victim of this offense, carries no small amount of voice in that." (Tr., 
pA1, L.14 - pA2, L.13.) 
On appeal, Guess does not contend that the district court failed to 
recognize the issue before it as one of discretion. Rather, he contends, 
variously, that the district court misapplied the law, made erroneous factual 
findings and, ultimately, had no discretion to deny the requested relief under the 
facts as Guess perceives them. (See generally Appellant's brief, pp.28-38.) For 
the reasons that follow, all of Guess' arguments are unavailing and fail to show 
any abuse of discretion by the district court. 
18 
Guess' first claim of error centers on his assertion that, by withholding 
judgment in the first place, the district court "must have implicitly found it to be 
'compatible with the public interest'" and, as such, was somehow precluded from 
making a contrary finding in relation to Guess' subsequently filed motions for I.C. 
§ 19-2604(1) relief. (Appellant's brief, pp.29-30; see also Appellant's brief, p.34 
(arguing that "the district court and State are collaterally estopped" from relying 
on victim's fear in "compatible with the public interest" analysis because court 
and state were aware when Guess entered his plea and received a withheld 
judgment that victim feared him).) Guess is incorrect. The district court's finding 
at the guilty plea and sentencing stages of the proceedings that "the interests of 
justice would best be served" by withholding judgment and placing Guess on 
probation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2601(3) (see R., vol. I, p.104) was, in effect, 
nothing more than a finding that Guess should have the opportunity to avoid the 
stigma of a criminal conviction and to someday have his case dismissed and his 
civil rights restored. I.C. § 19-2604(1) (where sentence has been withheld, court 
may set aside plea, dismiss case and discharge defendant upon defendant's 
application); Ex parte Medley, 73 Idaho 474, 479, 253 P.2d 794, 797 (1953) 
(when court withholds judgment it "creates ... a hope in the heart of the accused 
that he may ultimately be released under an order of probation without the 
stigma of a judgment of conviction" (emphasis added». That was an entirely 
different finding than the one the court was required to make in relation to Guess' 
motion for dismissal - i.e., whether it was "compatible with the public interest" to 
ultimately grant the requested relief that would have the effect 
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of actually restoring Guess' civil rights. 3 Guess' claim that the district court's 
decision to withhold judgment in the first place somehow bound it to grant his 
subsequent motion for dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1) is meritless. 
Guess next argues that, because he "complied with probation and better 
than 'any defendant [the district court could] remember while on probation' ... , 
the plain and rationale [sic] meaning of I.C. § 19-2604(1), interpreted to not 
render an absurd result, dictates that the district court had no discretion to deny 
relief." (Appellant's brief, p.30 (brackets and emphasis original) (citations 
omitted).) This argument is also meritless. By its plain language, I.C. § 19-
2604(1) requires a defendant seeking dismissal of his case to show both that he 
has no adjudicated probation violations and that the requested dismissal is 
"compatible with the public interest." If the legislature had intended to grant trial 
courts the authority to set aside a defendant's plea and finally dismiss a case 
merely upon a showing that the defendant complied with probation, it easily 
3 Although I.C. § 19-2604(1) contains no limitation on the civil rights that are 
restored to a defendant upon final dismissal of the case, there was some debate 
among the parties below as to whether, in the event Guess' case was dismissed, 
his right to possess firearms would nevertheless be limited by virtue of I.C. § 18-
310. (See R., vol. II, pp.262, 269-72; Tr., p.17, L.21 - p.18, L.25, p.30, Ls.8-21.) 
The state maintains, as it did below, that the I.C. § 18-310(3) provides the 
exclusive method by which Guess' gun rights may be restored. However, 
because the district court did not grant Guess' requests for an I.C. § 19-2604(1) 
dismissal and, therefore, did not purport either to fully restore or to limit the 
restoration of Guess' civil rights, Guess' claim on appeal that the court erred by 
"refus[ing] to restore" his gun rights (Appellant's brief, pp.41-45) is not properly 
before this Court. See State v. Huntsman, 146 Idaho 580,585, 199 P.3d 155, 
160 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Grube, 126 Idaho 377,387,883 P.2d 1069, 1079 
(1994) (citing State v. Fisher, 123 Idaho 481, 485, 849 P.2d 942, 946 (1993); 
Dunlick, Inc. v. Utah-Idaho Concrete Pipe Co., 77 Idaho 499, 502, 295 P.2d 700, 
702 (1956)) ("in order for an issue to be raised on appeal, the record must reveal 
an adverse ruling which forms the basis for an assignment of error"). 
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could have done so. The fact that legislature required, as an additional 
consideration, that the dismissal also be "compatible with the public interest" 
shows the legislature's intent that success on probation and compatibility with 
the public interest are not always synonymous. Indeed, the district court found 
that the two were not synonymous in this case. Guess' argument that he was 
entitled to relief merely because he was an exemplary probationer utterly ignores 
the "compatible with the public interest" requirement of I.C. § 19-2604(1) and 
shows no abuse of discretion by the district court. 
Next, Guess argues that the district court "misapplied the law when it 
determined that a victim's 'fear' supported a finding that it was not 'compatible 
with the public interest''' to set aside Guess' plea to aggravated assault and 
finally dismiss the case. (Appellant's brief, p.30.) According to Guess, because 
the words "victim" and "fear" do not expressly appear in either I.C. §§ 19-2601 (3) 
(statute authorizing withheld judgment) or 19-2604(1), the fact that a victim is 
fearful and/or objects to the defendant's request for dismissal is not relevant and 
may not be considered by the court in determining whether the requested 
dismissal is "compatible with the public interest." (Appellant's brief, pp.30-32.) 
Guess' interpretation of the term "public interest," as it is used in the statute, is 
unduly restrictive and ignores the fact that victims' rights are a matter of public 
interest under Idaho law. See Idaho Const., art. I, § 22 (enumerating rights of 
crime victims, including rights to "fairness, respect, dignity and privacy 
throughout the criminal justice process," to "timely disposition of the case," to 
notice of court proceedings, to "be present at all criminal justice proceedings," 
21 
and to "be heard, upon request, at all criminal justice proceedings considering a 
plea of guilty, sentencing, incarceration or release of the defendant, unless 
manifest injustice would result"); I.C. § 19-5306 (same). In a case such as this, 
where the granting of relief would result in the setting aside of a defendant's 
guilty plea to a violent crime, a dismissal of the case and a restoration of the 
defendant's rights (including, at least potentially, the right to possess firearms), 
there can be no serious question that the public has an interest in the victim's 
safety and sense of well-being. 
Guess argues that interpreting the "compatible with public interest" 
requirement of I.C. § 19-2604(1) to include consideration of the victim's fear 
"would empower the Judge and the victim with unlimited discretion" to deny a 
defendant I.C. § 19-2604(1) relief, even where such relief is otherwise 
appropriate. (Appellant's brief, p.32.) The state disagrees. As recognized by 
the district court in this case, a victim's continuing fear of a defendant is one of 
many considerations that must be balanced in determining whether to grant the 
defendant's request for I.C. § 19-2604(1) relief. (See Tr., p.39, LS.15-20 ("I'm 
not saying that Michele Guess's acquiescence in this request is what needs to 
occur. ... [A]t some point I may conclude that that acquiescence will never be 
forthcoming and that it is yet compatible with the public interest to grant Mr. 
Guess the relief he requests."); R, pp.285-86 (,'The determination that Guess 
should be granted relief under I.C. § 19-2604(1) is not entirely dependent on 
Michele's acquiescence. Such acquiescence may never occur. Nonetheless, 
this Court is unwilling to disregard her fear of the Defendant and her objection to 
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him being granted relief pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1), at this time.").) That the 
court considered the victim's continuing fear of Guess in determining whether the 
requested relief was yet "compatible with the public interest" in this case does 
not, by itself, show an abuse of discretion. 
Guess next argues that the district court's findings that the victim still 
feared Guess and objected to his request for an I.C. § 19-2604(1) dismissal are 
not supported by any evidence. (Appellant's brief, pp.32-3S.) This argument is 
patently meritless. Michele appeared telephonically at the hearing on Guess' 
motion to dismiss and explicitly stated that she "still [had] some fear" and that, 
"as a victim, will always be in fear of Mr. Guess." (Tr., p.55, Ls.17-23.) Although 
Michele never used the word "object," she did ask the court to consider her 
"rights ... as a victim," the law, her continued fear of Guess, and her "feelings 
about [her] position" as expressed in a letter she wrote to the court at the time of 
sentencing.4 (Tr., p.55, Ls.11-24.) It is thus clear from the context of Michele's 
comments that, while she would "honor[]" any decision the court made, she 
opposed Guess' motion for dismissal and an accompanying restoration of his 
civil rights. (ld.) Guess has failed to show clear error in the district court's factual 
4 In the letter she wrote for purposes of sentencing, Michele described her 
feelings toward Guess as those of "unbelievable terror," and she asked the court 
to "take into consideration the respect of [her] worth as an individual" and to 
impose a "strong" sentence that would ensure Guess would never again harm 
her or any other person. (Tr., p.106, Ls.14-16, p.107, L.10 - p.10S, L.1S.) 
Michele reiterated those sentiments in her interview with the presentence 
investigator (PSI, pp.4-7) and specifically expressed in that interview her fear 
that, after Guess' probation term ended, he would be allowed to possess 
weapons again. (PSI, p.6). 
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findings that Michele still feared Guess and objected to his motion for I.C. § 19-
2604(1) relief. 
Finally, Guess argues that the district court erred in relying on Michele's 
fear as the basis not to set aside Guess' guilty plea, dismiss the case and restore 
his civil rights because, according to Guess, there were no facts or evidence to 
support a finding that Michele's continued fear was objectively reasonable. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.33, 36-38.) To support this claim, Guess points to the facts 
that he was a model probationer, never violated the order that prohibited him 
from having contact with Michele, was cordial to Michele during their divorce 
proceedings, and had numerous letters of support, including one from his former 
psychologist who opined that Guess no longer posed a threat to Michele. (ld.) 
The state does not concede that, as a matter of law, the district court was 
required to find Michele's fear objectively reasonable before it could rely on it as 
a basis to conclude that dismissal of Guess' case was not yet compatible with 
the public interest, nor has Guess cited any authority that stands for such 
proposition. (See Appellant's brief, p.36 (citing standard for self-defense).) 
Assuming for purposes of argument that an objectively reasonable fear is the 
standard, however, there was plenty of evidence before the court to support the 
conclusion that Michele's continued fear of Guess was objectively reasonable in 
this case. 
By his own admission, the restoration of his right to possess firearms was 
one of the primary reasons Guess sought dismissal of his case.5 (Appellant's 
5 See footnote 3, infra. 
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brief, p.2 n.1; R., vol. II, pp.245-56; Tr., p.18, Ls.7-12, p.34, L.16 - p.35, L.12.) 
Yet, just five years earlier, while embroiled in a bitter divorce dispute with 
Michele, Guess followed Michele and her divorce attorney to an open vault in the 
basement of his home and, while their backs were turned, "he produced a .40 
caliber Glock pistol and moved the slide to indicate a bullet had been advanced 
into the gun's barrel." (R., vol. II, p.281; PSI, pp.2-4, 7-8.) When Michele and 
her attorney turned around, Guess was pointing the gun at them and threatened 
to kill both of them. (R., vol. II, p.281; PSI, pp.3-4,8.) Michele moved toward 
Guess and Guess twice struck her in the face with his fist. (R., vol. II, p.281; 
PSI, pp.3, 8.) He also ordered Michele's attorney to walk into the vault and 
remove his pants. (PSI, pp.3-4.) While Michele and her attorney were ultimately 
able to escape the home without being shot, Michele feared throughout the 
ordeal that Guess was going to shoot her and then shoot himself. (PSI, pp.3-5.) 
Even assuming the district court was required to find that Michele's 
continued fear of Guess was objectively reasonable, the above facts, specifically 
considered by the district court in relation to Guess' motions to dismiss (Tr., p.56, 
L.25 - p.57, L.4; R., vol. II, p.281), support such a finding. There can be no 
question that an objectively reasonable person, having been held at gunpoint 
and battered by her estranged husband, would continue to fear her assailant five 
years later, particularly when he is specifically seeking to have his right to 
possess firearms restored. Given the victim's objectively reasonable fear, the 
relatively close proximity of the crime to Guess' motion, and the fact that the 
underlying crime involved a firearm, it was entirely reasonable for the district 
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court to conclude that the setting aside of Guess' guilty plea and dismissal of his 
case at this early date was not yet "compatible with the public interest" as 
required by I.C. § 19-2604(1). Guess has failed to show an abuse of discretion 
in the denial, without prejudice, of his motions for I.C. § 19-2604(1) relief. 
III. 
Guess Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Exceeded Its Jurisdiction 
By Denying His Motions For I.C. § 19-2604(1) Relief 
A. Introduction 
Guess argues that, by denying his motions to dismiss his case pursuant to 
I.C. § 19-2604(1), the district court "unilaterally and indefinitely" extended his 
withheld judgment and probationary period beyond the five-year maximum 
sentence for aggravated assault, thereby exceeding its jurisdiction. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.38-40.) Guess' argument fails. That the district court declined to set 
aside Guess' plea and dismiss his case pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1) did not 
extend the withheld judgment, which by its own terms lapsed after five years. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Whether a court lacks jurisdiction is a question of law that may be raised 
at any time, and over which appellate courts exercise free review." State v. 
Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004). The appellate court also 
freely reviews the construction and application of a statute. State v. Shock, 133 
Idaho 753, 755, 992 P.2d 202, 204 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Schumacher, 131 
Idaho 484,485,959 P.2d 465, 466 (Ct. App. 1998). 
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c. The District Court Did Not Exceed Its Jurisdiction Or Indefinitely Withhold 
Judgment By Denying Guess' Motions For I.C. § 19-2604(1) Relief 
The power of a court to withhold judgment in a criminal case derives from 
I.C. § 19-2601(3), which provides: 
Whenever any person shall have been convicted, or enter a 
plea of guilty, in any district court of the state of Idaho, of or to any 
crime against the laws of the state, except those of treason or 
murder, the court in its discretion may: 
3. Withhold judgment on such terms and for such time as it may 
prescribe and may place the defendant on probation[.] 
"If the court grants a withheld judgment to a particular defendant and places that 
defendant on probation, jurisdiction is retained by the district court during the 
period of probation and the court has continuing jurisdiction to modify the 
conditions of the defendant's probation." State v. Branson, 128 Idaho 790, 792, 
919 P.2d 319, 321 (1996) (citing Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454, 460, 808 P.2d 
373,379 (1991)); see also Ex parte Medley, 73 Idaho 474,483,253 P.2d 794, 
800 (1953). A court may not, however, withhold judgment indefinitely. Ex parte 
Medley, 73 Idaho at 483-84, 253 P.3d at 800. If it does so, "it has, for all 
practical purposes, lost jurisdiction to proceed further." ~ (citation omitted). 
After Guess pled guilty to aggravated assault, the district court, acting 
pursuant to its authority under I.C. § 19-2601 (3), entered an order withholding 
judgment and placing him on probation for five years. (R., vol. l,pp.103-11.) The 
order was file stamped September 6, 2006, and was dated "nunc pro tunc to 
August 31, 2006," by the district judge. (R., vol. I, pp.103, 110.) Assuming for 
purposes of argument the "nunc pro tunc" date controls, the withheld judgment 
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expired, by its own terms, on August 31, 2011.6 Contrary to Guess' assertions 
on appeal, the fact that the district court did not thereafter dismiss the case 
pursuant to Guess' motions for I. C. § 19-2604( 1) relief did not extend the 
withheld judgment beyond the expiration of its five-year term. 
Idaho Code § 19-2604(1) gives the court discretion to set aside a guilty 
plea and dismiss a case in which a withheld judgment has been previously 
entered. The statute says nothing about dismissing the withheld judgment itself, 
and the relief there under is not automatic but is subject to a finding by the court 
that the defendant has no adjudicated probation violations and the final dismissal 
of the case is "compatible with the public interest." I.C. § 19-2604(1). The 
district court in this case resolved the "compatible with the public interest" 
question in favor of delaying I.C. § 19-2604(1) relief and, in so doing, put Guess 
in the same position as any other defendant whose motion for I.C. § 19-2604(1) 
relief has been denied or who never made an I. C. § 19-2604(1) motion at all. 
The denial of relief did not extend the withheld judgment which, by its terms, is 
no longer enforceable against Guess (in the sense that the court cannot enter 
judgment), but was a legitimate exercise of the court's discretion to decline to 
6 Because the withheld judgment expired on August 31, 2011, the court had no 
jurisdiction beyond that date to enforce the withheld judgment - i.e., it had no 
jurisdiction to keep Guess on probation, modify the conditions of probation, or 
revoke probation and enter judgment based upon any alleged probation 
violation. See Branson, 128 Idaho at 792, 919 P.2d at 321 (if defendant violates 
probation within period of withheld judgment, court may revoke probation and 
"impose any sentence which originally might have been imposed at the time of 
conviction" (citations and internal quotations omitted)). The state thus agrees 
with Guess that the court's December 23, 2011 order that purported to finally 
discharge Guess from probation (R., vol. II, p.213), when his probation period 
had already expired as a matter of law, is void. 
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dismiss the case in which the order withholding judgment had been entered. 
Guess has failed to establish that the district court exceeded its jurisdiction by 
denying his I.C. § 19-2604(1) motions. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
orders denying Guess' motions for dismissal of his withheld judgment. 
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